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NOTE: The following Draft has been compiled from both public, unclassified sources and archival classified material from CIA records. If certain passages require revision to ensure declassification, the author requests the courtesy of a meeting with the reviewing officer to establish a satisfactory resolution. (Submitted by Col Michael E. Haas, USAF, Ret. through CIA History office (Dr. Kevin Rummel) 21 DEC 95

CIA

I wonder if there is any foundation for the rumors that have come to me to the effect this Central Intelligence Agency . . . is contemplating operational activities

Representative Fred Busby, 1947¹

The Road to Korea

The National Security Act passed in July, 1947 remains one of the most powerful legislative actions in modern American history. Drafted in the dawn of Cold War fears it calls for a massive re-organization of the nation's most powerful institutions . . . and the creation of others. It created a new Department of Defense, a Joint Chiefs of Staff, and an independent Air Force. Moving beyond strictly military matters, it also created a powerful National Security Council (NSC) to assist the White House in national security decision-making. And almost as a last minute add-on, it created something called the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), this country's first, national level intelligence organization independent of the various Departments of the Executive Branch.

The CIA was an organization born with grave misgivings by many of its creators, as the opening quote of Representative Busby's statement clearly conveys. But in the end their misgivings were overcome by the much more visceral fear of Stalin's public bombast to unleash the massive Soviet army on western Europe. President Truman knew that the stampede to demobilize America's military forces at the end of World War II had left the US without a credible, conventional military deterrent to Stalin's threats; so did Stalin. And any US fantasies that its exclusive ownership of the atomic bomb would deter the communists evaporated in 1949, along with the Soviet demonstration that it too possessed the genie of nuclear destruction.

With both the conventional and nuclear options now a long-shot at best to counter the Soviet threat, the NSC quest for a rational alternative option became an all-

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With both the conventional and nuclear options now a long-shot at best to counter the Soviet threat, the NSC quest for a rational alternative option became an all-consuming search. And that search soon led to a second look at the CIA, whose legislative charter language clearly limited its duties to "coordinating the intelligence activities of the several departments and agencies in the interest of national security."¹ It was a carefully worded limitation included in the legislation specifically to calm the fears of Representative Busby and other concerned congressmen. But it wouldn't stand the test of Cold War pressures on a worried American government.

Those pressures came early and before the dust even settled on the National Security Act, the NSC, one of its own creations, met in December, 1947, to modify the CIA's charter. It did so with National Security Council Directive # 4/A, which authorized and directed the new Agency "to carry out covert psychological warfare."² To carry out these covert operations an ad hoc group was formed which was later formalized as the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), one of the most powerful divisions within the fast-growing Agency.

To head the OPC the Agency chose from within its ranks a World War II veteran of covert warfare in Europe named Frank Wisner. A lawyer by training, Wisner had gained his combat experience while serving with the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the CIA's *de facto* predecessor organization prior to its disbandment in January 1946.³ Energetic and shrewd, Wisner would eventually oversee the expansion of the Agency's covert operations branch from [redacted] in 1949 to nearly [redacted] by 1952.⁴ Its overseas stations expanded from [redacted] to [redacted] during the same period, a growth fueled by a budget that grew from [redacted] million to [redacted] million.⁵

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The Korean war would play a major role in spurring this tremendous growth, and like all organizations enduring overly-rapid expansion, the CIA would suffer in the process. And the real suffering began in the summer of 1950.

Like shockwaves racing outward from the epicenter of an earthquake, North Korea's attack generated merciless death and destruction on everything in its path. While the obvious physical damage was restricted to the Korean peninsula itself, the political shock waves seemed to roll on forever. Ten thousand miles to the east they hit the White House like a stinging slap to the back of the head. In Washington all eyes had been looking across the Atlantic, to the seemingly inevitable showdown with Stalin over the future of a Europe still shattered in the aftermath of World War II.

Perhaps the first US casualty of the Korean War was CIA Director, Rear Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoeter. Despite having sent a series of warnings to MacArthur's headquarters in Tokyo, the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Pentagon, and key officials in the White House, the unlucky admiral found himself the most expedient public victim when the inevitable hunt for scapegoats began in Washington.⁶ Left unharmed were the careers

¹ By 1949 OSS veterans like Wisner would represent one-third of the CIA's total personnel strength (See Paddock, 41).

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of others, such as the highest ranking military intelligence officer in the Far East, and the Army's senior intelligence officer in the Pentagon, who had specifically predicted no war in Korea during the summer of 1950.^{xii} *C'est la vie! C'est l'Washington!*

The political sacking of Hillenkoetter may have deflected some embarrassing questions away from the Pentagon and the White House, but it also cost the young agency some sorely needed credibility within Washington and the country at large. If the CIA had any room for optimism at the time, it might be found in the credibility the Agency soon accrued in Washington's power circles with the shrewd appointment of Hillenkoetter's successor, General Walter Bedell Smith, Eisenhower's former Chief of Staff during WWII and former Ambassador to Moscow. Described as "brilliant and tough-minded," Smith took control of the Agency in a manner that left no doubt in anyone's mind who was in charge.

Problems in MacArthur's Court

For the CIA the "Korea Problem" posed three distinct challenges. To meet the first it had to keep the Cold War in perspective. Who knew if Korea wasn't simply one of Soviet Premier Stalin's diversionary tactics before the main blow fell on western Europe? To meet the second it had to support General Douglas A. MacArthur's Far East Command (FECOM) in its campaign on the Korean peninsula. And General MacArthur, a legend in his time with the American public, unquestionably one of the most brilliant commanders in American history . . . absolutely loathed the idea of an intelligence/special operations command in his theater, but not under his control.

And therein lies the third challenge and crux of the problem for the CIA in the Far East. How to be effective in a war in which the only forces *more* opposed to your presence than the enemy . . . were the headquarters of your own military forces?! In the end the problem(s) would be partially resolved at least, but in the early days precious energy and resources would be sidetracked from the main effort as the CIA fought FECOM for a legitimate role in the war.

So strong were MacArthur's objections to a CIA presence in the Far East, and so great his political power, that it was not until one month before the outbreak of war before the Agency was successful in establishing a station in Tokyo.^{xiii} Too late to have an effective organization in place when the war broke out, the Agency (OPC's Wisner) did however make an inspired choice in the name of a certain Hans Tofte to head OPC's Far East Branch in Japan.^{xiv}

Hans Tofte was, like his boss Wisner, an OSS veteran from the European Theater. A talented linguist who spoke six languages⁵, Tofte was an obvious high-priority recruit for the Agency. More significant still in terms of the Korean War was Tofte's pre-war experience in northeast Asia working for the Danish East Asiatic Company. During these years Tofte had come to learn the terrain and transportation corridors of Manchuria and North Korea as had few westerners.

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But even if Tofte was the right man at the right time for the job, the dominant reality for both Tofte and the Agency was that the three-year old CIA had never been to a conventional war before. Like an attacking shark whose dorsal fin ^{had} not yet broken the surface, there was another deadly factor hidden from Wisner and Tofte's view in 1950, one that would threaten the CIA's success in Korea: Neither of these OSS veterans of unconventional warfare in Europe had experienced anything like the sheer ruthlessness of Asian communists controlling the populations under their control.

If the CIA's guidance for supporting conventional war was loose, it did on the other hand allow plenty of freedom for operatives with imagination and drive. For authority to mount unconventional warfare against the communists, Tofte was armed with the previously introduced NSC Directive 4/A (NSCD 4/A), and NSCD 10/2, a subsequent Directive that greatly expanded the CIA charter in this field to include:

Any [emphasis added] covert activities related to propaganda; preventive direct action, including sabotage, anti-sabotage, demolition and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas and refugee liberation groups; and support of indigenous anti-Communist elements in threatened countries of the free world.²¹

NSCD 10/2 was even more of a hammer than the wording would suggest, because of the interpretation put on its passage within the intelligence community. In his excellent history on the early cold war days, author William R Corson notes:

The intelligence community's reaction to the NSC's apparently unanimous endorsement and support of "dirty tricks" authorizations was swift. In their view no holds were barred. The NSC 10/2 decision was broadly interpreted to mean that not only the President but all the guys on top had said to put the brass knuckles on and go to work [emphasis added].²²

Tofte's experience would prove invaluable in executing this authority in the very areas in which he once lived. But before this experience could make itself felt on the enemy, he had first to establish a base in Japan, both geographically and "politically" speaking. Even though the geographic challenge called for a base big enough to support one thousand people²³ and a major communications site, it would still prove by far the easier of the two to resolve. In short order Tofte found the needed area within the confines of Atsugi Air Base, located some 47 miles south of Tokyo.²⁴ [REDACTED]

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At this stage Tofte came face to face personally with FECOM's overt distaste for the CIA presence, in the personage of Major General Charles A. Willoughby, the senior

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intelligence officer on MacArthur's staff in Tokyo. Willoughby's March, 1950 prediction that "there will be no civil war in Korea this spring or summer,"¹ had apparently done little to shake his confidence in his own talent or authority. Difficult to deal with, his reputation suffers with a uniformity of denigration's that include "tyrant", "imperious," and "Sir Charles," from those who knew him at the time.²

The situation deteriorated to the point that Willoughby actually had Japanese counterintelligence agents putting Tofte's CIA agents under surveillance.³ It was an ugly environment that would continue sporadically until eventually both MacArthur and Willoughby left the theater later in the war.² Despite this bureaucratic "war in Tokyo," the CIA presence was growing dramatically, if belatedly. On the FECOM staff OPC was established for cover purposes with the title "Historical Research Section" (HRS-V).⁴ Meanwhile, the Agency's intelligence-gathering arm, the Office of Special Operations (OSO), already had its agents on the Korean peninsula.

The apparent contradiction between General Willoughby's distaste for the CIA and the Agency's rapid if belated growth can be resolved quite simply. At the outbreak of war, General Willoughby quite simply had no where else to turn but the Agency. Just as FECOM as a command was not ready for war, neither were its intelligence officers who, like everyone else in FECOM, had their budgets slashed severely in the preceding years. Not only money but trained intelligence collectors were absent.

As a result Willoughby put great pressure on the CIA to perform tactical, battlefield intelligence collection, a mission substantially outside its national level mission as dictated by the National Security Council. And whatever its reservations, the Agency was hardly in a position to refuse, given the dire nature of the emergency and the bad light such a decision ?

Land of the Morning Calm

On the day the war broke out the CIA force in Korea totaled [redacted] officers and [redacted] clerks; all OSO staff.⁵ Retreating southward from Seoul to Suwon two days after the departure of the US Ambassador, the OSO personnel were augmented in Suwon with additional CIA communications gear and operators flown in to keep the Ambassador in touch with Japan. OSO officers were pressed into emergency duty as military intelligence officers and the OSO communicators became the Embassy's primary link to the outside world.

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As the situation on the peninsula continued to deteriorate in July, the Embassy-OSO staff moved farther south, ending up in Taegu with the 8th US Army, Korea (EUSAK) headquarters. Meanwhile, the [redacted] OSO had already begun training

¹ MacArthur's successor, General Matthew B. Ridgway, held a much more cooperative attitude toward the CIA, perhaps reflecting a global perspective more encompassing than MacArthur's Far East focus developed over decades living in the region. Ridgway's successors in turn continued to maintain a largely tolerant attitude toward Agency activities in their theater.

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Korean intelligence agents near the southern port city of Pusan. To support the rapidly growing facility, hastily-trained radio operators were flown in to maintain contact with stay-behind [REDACTED] agents near the capitol cities of Seoul and Pyongyang area.ⁱⁱⁱ

Still other OSO-directed agents [REDACTED] were used extensively as "line-crossers," bringing in valuable front-line, tactical information. Included in these initial successes was an effective intelligence-gathering effort near Inchon harbor prior to MacArthur's successful amphibious landing near that port city in September.

For one such mission into the Inchon area, two OSO officer brought two married couples brought together on an island off Inchon, then split up into two separate teams with the husband from the first matched with the wife of the second. While the first team went ashore near Inchon the second was held in "protective custody." When the first team returned, neither agent was permitted to see their spouse. Instead, the second team was sent into the same area with the same mission. When the observations of both teams were compared and corroborated, the information was sent to MacArthur's headquarters and the two couples returned to their communities. It was a period of frenetic growth for OSO, and of course OPC was moving at the same pace to set up its unconventional warfare teams.

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Like OSO, Tofte's OPC needed a secure training base as close to the action as possible. The small island of Yong-do in the Bay of Pusan proved an ideal location for his purposes, and as the fall of 1950 progressed Tofte's US military staff, headed by Marine Lieutenant Colonel "Dutch" Kramer managed to put some 1200 Koreans through basic guerrilla training.ⁱⁱⁱ The best of this group was selected for further OPC training at the [REDACTED] facility [REDACTED] opened in December of that year.ⁱⁱⁱ As encouraging as these first steps were, MacArthur's bold Inchon landing in September were much like the starter's gun at a race as the Agency began its first infiltration's behind North Korean lines.

A Crowded Field

General Willoughby may have had no alternative but to press the CIA for military tactical intelligence collection, but within months if not weeks of the North Korean attack FECOM had effectively lost control of positive intelligence operations in North Korea. As the Agency soon discovered the "intelligence race" was a crowded and confused field indeed; so much so the "runners" were stepping all over each other. A major problem that plagued early war efforts was the lack of coordination between the CIA and the military, and worse between the various military services. A brief sketch of just the major intelligence organizations operating in the fall of 1950 highlights the duplication:

- As described earlier the CIA had divided its forces into OSO (intelligence gathering) and OPC (unconventional warfare) in both Washington and Japan. But the tidy appearance of this organizational separation on paper becomes blurred with agency

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organizations under cover within the military services, such as Fifth Air Force's Technical Analysis Group (SAF/TAG).² In addition the Agency's early flight support came from USAF's Special Air Missions Detachment and later B Flight (See *Air Operations*, later in this chapter). Both of these USAF units supported both OSO and OPC, as well as military operations. And throughout July and August, 1951, both OSO and OPC units in Korea (with a combined strength of approximately 100 personnel) were combined into the Agency's first Clandestine Services field mission.³ The mission was given the military cover name Joint Advisory Commission, Korea (JACK), a component of the UN command.⁴ Interestingly, this action was repeated at CIA headquarters in Washington six months later.⁵

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- The US Air Force also had its own intelligence organization, active from the first days of the war, that performed both intelligence gathering *and unconventional warfare behind enemy lines*. Known initially as Special Activities Unit #1, then Detachments 1 and 2 of the 6004th Air Intelligence Squadron, this effort was commanded by one of the most phenomenal characters to emerge in the war, a Counter-Intelligence Corps Special Agent named Donald Nichols.

A junior Warrant Officer when the war broke out, Nichols was fluent in Korean, and had the personal trust and 24 hour-a-day access to both South Korea's President Syngman Rhee and numerous military generals. He was later awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for his role in leading a behind the lines mission, in conjunction with the Agency's SAF/TAG, to recover parts from a downed MIG-15 fighter, the first physical evidence obtained in the war.

- General MacArthur's FECOM and soon EUSAK also started or expanded numerous intelligence gathering and unconventional warfare units⁶, the largest being FECOM's Liaison Group (FEC/LG, based in Japan), and its subordinate office in Korea, the Liaison Detachment (FEC/LD, in EUSAK headquarters).

- The US Navy and Marine Corps also had both intelligence collection and unconventional warfare units, the latter including coastal raiding parties comprised of Navy Underwater Demolition Teams, Marine Reconnaissance personnel, and even British commandos. Concentrating on North Korea's eastern coastline, these activities were run with a minimum of coordination with Army, Air Force, and Agency case officers, all of whom were also running maritime coastal operations along the coast.

² In January, 1952, OSO and OPC functions were combined into a single Clandestine Service (DDP) with the signing of Notice No. 2-52, by the Director, Central Intelligence, General Walter Bedell Smith. (See *CIA IN KOREA, 1946 - 1963*, Vol. III, 99, (S))

³ By 1952 these units, under the control of CCRAK, would number thousands of Korean guerrillas based on offshore islands along North Korea's northwest coast. These guerrillas were in addition to OPC's "private army."

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- The Republic of Korea's Higher Intelligence Department (HID), which performed tactical battlefield intelligence collection through the use of "line crossers" as well as a number of domestic surveillance operations.

All in all it was a bizarre situation for those involved. One in which local cooperation at the "worker-bee" level was generally satisfactory, but also one in which tremendous duplication and inefficiencies existed. Looking deeper into this Alice in Wonderland mosaic of "intelligence" operations, the Agency found still another major problem running throughout virtually all organizations, the blurring of intelligence gathering and guerrilla warfare missions within the same unit.

Real Estate

October, 1950 was an eventful month for the UN, the communists, and the Agency. On the 7th UN forces pushed north of the 38th parallel in pursuit of retreating North Koreans, while OPC established a station in downtown Seoul, at the Traymore Hotel.^{xvii} Five days later the first communist Chinese "volunteers" entered North Korea, preceding by two days a FECOM/G-2 intelligence estimate that Chinese threats to enter the war were mere "bluff".^{xviii} In a move more fortunate than they could have guessed at the time, OSO agents made good use of October by recruiting in the North Korean interior for future penetration agents.^{xix} As events were soon to prove, the recruited agents would earn their pay not as penetration agents, but rather stay-behind agents.

Following the "surprise" intervention of the Chinese in late 1950, a shaken and demoralized FECOM gathered the heads of its major intelligence organizations together for a post mortem in January 1951. A number of problems surfaced, virtually all of which traced their roots back to the proliferation of military and civilian intelligence organizations duplicating their efforts, even in the same area of operations (AO) behind enemy lines. One of the first solutions offered and adopted was the establishment of firm boundaries separating OPC and military unconventional warfare "turf".

Working effectively together, the CIA and the Operations Directorate, Eighth US Army-Korea (G-3/EUSAK), agreed to a north-south line dividing North Korea into western and eastern AOs. As the Agency had already established the nucleus of a guerrilla movement in the extreme northeastern mountains of North Korea, with bases on offshore islands, the eastern AO was given to Toft's OPC. EUSAK took the larger, western AO, where a flood of North Korean civilians fleeing southward from the Chinese had found temporary refuge on hundreds of small islands off that coast. By the fall of 1951, EUSAK had organized these refugees into a guerrilla force (of varying degrees of effectiveness) numbering nearly 8,000 strong.^{xx}

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~~SECRET~~*CCRAK, "the sauce to cook the CIA goose"*

By the summer of 1951 both the CIA's chief, General Walter Bedell Smith, and the Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall reached an agreement that something had to be done to coordinate behind-the-lines operations in North Korea. That agreement took form in the CIA's agreement to put its Clandestine Field Services units (OPC/OSO) in Korea under the control of the Commander in Chief, Far East (CINCFE) as long as the war continued.^{xxxi} But the agreement left unspecified how the CINCFE would exercise this control, an omission that would later become the source of much bad blood between the Agency and FECOM's army staff officers when the final plan was revealed.

In October of that year a series of high-level CIA/military conferences were held in Seoul to establish the specifics of command and control of covert and clandestine activities in Korea, as well as elsewhere in the FECOM theater. Agency representatives at the conferences were operating with very specific guidance from Agency headquarters in Washington

Assumed that Far East Command proposal is . . . intended to facilitate transfer of total responsibility for covert, clandestine and related activities to Central Intelligence Agency at an early date. At this instant we must depend upon your [FECOM] assurance of continued validity of this assumption.^{xxxii}

Clearly, the Agency's enthusiasm for unifying the unconventional war program was predicated on it being unified under JACK, or some other such organization run by the Agency in Korea. What emerged from the Seoul meetings was a new organization that would coordinate all of FECOM's military and civilian UW programs under one boss. That organization was designated the Combined Command for Reconnaissance Activities-Korea (CCRAK), the cover name for the same unit whose classified title was Covert, Clandestine and Related Activities-Korea (again, CCRAK).^{xxxiii} At the same time, several other agreements were agreed to by FECOM/G-2 representatives during these meetings to define the new organization, including

- Army, Air Force, Navy, and CIA units would maintain their respective organizational integrity.
- All the services named above would place their relevant forces under CCRAK.
- CIA operations of high sensitivity and/or long-term characteristics which extend into adjacent areas [outside the Korean peninsula - author] not directly involved in support of EUSAK, shall be exempted from CCRAK control.
- CCRAK would be a joint staff under one command [FECOM].^{xxxiv}

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All signatories at the Seoul conferences (including FECOM/G-2 representatives), agreed to these stipulations. Fifth Air Force (and apparently the Navy) took the extra effort to endorse both verbally and in writing the concept that the CIA was best suited to direct covert and clandestine activities in FECOM's area of operations.^{xxxv} What happened next stunned most of the Seoul conference signatories, the Agency in particular.

Orders establishing CCRAK were issued by FECOM dated 28 November 1951. Almost every single point agreed upon by the signatories in Seoul, and almost every point insisted upon by CIA headquarters was ignored. The order was announced without advance notice to the senior CIA officer [redacted] or the commander, Fifth Air Force. Agency records also suggest it was done without the knowledge of CINCFE, General Ridgeway.^{xxxvi} Whatever the facts, the result was a *fait accompli* that left FECOM/G-2 officers firmly in control of covert and clandestine activities in FECOM.

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It was the poorest possible start for a "joint-service" organization dependent on the professional cooperation of all, especially considering that CCRAK had operational control, not command, of the units submitted to it by the individual services. One of the most troubling aspects of CCRAK's charter was its tacit authority to conduct missions north of the Yalu river, i.e. into Manchuria, China, and even the USSR itself.

This authority was accomplished by the simple expedient of dropping off the Seoul stipulation that such missions were the exclusive preserve of the Agency. It also had the effect of undermining CIA's case for maintaining its autonomy within FECOM, which in turn was based in large part on the Agency's need to accomplish its national mission (as directed by NSCDs 5 and 10/2) in "areas adjacent to" Korea. It didn't take long for trouble to erupt over the issue, and this time the fight occurred almost exclusively within the military's own ranks.

In a February, 1952, meeting of all CCRAK officers the new Chief,¹ CCRAK, army Colonel Washington M. Ives, announced the full scope of his plans to go "beyond the Yalu". A number of unit commanders present strongly voiced their doubts they had such a capability, and CCRAK's own USAF Deputy for Air made no bones that CCRAK "would be going way over its head" in attempting such missions.^{xxxvii} It didn't help matters much that CCRAK's first Chief was the former Deputy for Administration . . . FECOM/G-2. And though to his credit he demonstrated the integrity to confess he'd had little intelligence and no unconventional warfare background,^{xxxviii} the impression borne by CCRAK's staff and commanders that he was under strong pressure from FECOM/G-2 only made matters worse.

As part of CCRAK's charter the Deputy position was always to be filled by a CIA officer, someone selected by the Agency's headquarters in Washington. And initially at least, the Operations Officer for CCRAK was another Agency man, the Chief, Seoul

¹ As CCRAK was a staff function, not a command, the title "Chief" was appropriate.

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Station.⁶ While on paper these two positions would seem well-placed to protect Agency interests, it will be recalled that many of the Agency's most important interests were already being severely challenged by the authority invested in CCRAK by FECOM's G-2 officers. Now more than ever, the Agency officers found themselves tasked with tactical intelligence duties that could only detract from the resources needed to prosecute their (NSCDs 5, 10/2) national level mission. As the Agency archives note

Inasmuch as the desires of General Ridgeway [FECOM], General Van Fleet [EUSAK], General Everest [5AF], and Admiral Briscoe [7th Fleet] can only be met through long-range sensitive operations, the Chief/CIA Mission, Korea must spend time within CCRAK and then go back to his own Mission where the work must be performed.^{xxxix}

The two FECOM commanders who succeeded MacArthur after his recall in April, 1951, gave the Agency much more latitude in prosecuting its national missions in the Far East. But the situation in CCRAK failed to improve in any meaningful way from the CIA's viewpoint. JACK officers watched with growing dismay as army officers from FECOM/G-2 managed CCRAK activities with the belief that FECOM now had command of CIA resources in Korea. As to why the Agency chose not to go to the mat with FECOM over an issue that clearly troubled it greatly, the archives suggest one possible answer

With MacArthur's G-2 [Willoughby] gone, the CIA Chief [redacted] while 1.5 (1)
skeptically remembering that not long ago General Willoughby put CIA 1.6 (2)(1)
activities under surveillance [redacted] cautiously agreed not to
fight "city hall".^{xli}

Ironically, FECOM G-2's control (through CCRAK) over CIA activities was exactly what both MacArthur and Willoughby had always intended, should they not be able to keep the CIA out of FECOM altogether. In the words of one CIA historian, "Clearly, CCRAK was sauce to cook the CIA goose."^{xlii}

As the army officers in FECOM/G-2 and CCRAK headquarters strengthened their grip on intelligence and UW resources in Korea, CIA leaders quietly conducted their own reassessment of the resources it too was committing to Korea. The Agency had earlier committed three of its best senior clandestine services officers to JACK, two to work within CCRAK as Deputy Chief, and Chief, Counterintelligence, and the third as head of foreign intelligence activities.^{xlii} Concluding that the highly restrictive environment within CCRAK was essentially wasting the talents of the three officers, the Agency reassigned all of them from Korea in the following months. Relatively inexperienced officers were sent in their place and as the Agency historians candidly note, "... a regrettable side effect of the control exercised by CCRAK is that the Agency did not put its best foot forward in Korea in the last year of the war."^{xliii}

⁶ The CCRAK staff was organized into separate S-2 (Intelligence) and S-3 (Operations) functions, while S-1 (Personnel) and S-4 (Logistics) functions were combined. (See *THE SECRET WAR*, 11. (S))

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~~SECRET~~*Air Operations*

Immediately after the Inchon landing an Air Force C-47 flew the first OSO airborne infiltration mission behind enemy lines; [REDACTED] teams dropped into separate areas near Korea's northern border with China.²⁴⁷ These teams had received ten weeks intensive pre-mission training prior to their infiltration. The collective mission was to establish observation posts in the mountains overlooking the main corridors of transportation, especially those leading in from China and Russia.

[REDACTED] Despite the disappointing results, the agent-handlers were pleased to learn that within weeks, [REDACTED] agents inserted had returned to friendly territory, entering through either US Army or Marine Corps front-line positions. The major lesson drawn from this operation was that properly trained teams could survive behind enemy lines, if they were infiltrated without detection.

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The Agency would eventually develop a substantial air transport capability of its own in Asia, with its control of [REDACTED] C-46 and C-47 transports belonging to Civil Air Transport (CAT), its proprietary airline in Asia. Initially based in Formosa, most of CAT's fleet was soon moved north to [REDACTED] Korea, [REDACTED] for Agency use during the war.²⁴⁸ But for the first ten months of the war, it was the US Air Force that carried its agents deep into North Korea.²⁴⁹ [REDACTED]

During the first twenty months of the war, the primary Air Force unit assigned to support CIA airborne insertions was Unit 4, a special C-47 detachment from the Far East Air Force's (FEAF) 21st Troop Carrier Squadron (21 TCS). Based initially at Taegu following the Inchon landings, Unit 4 moved north to Seoul's Kimpo airfield . . . only to be forced back south to Taegu following the Chinese intervention and offensive later that year. When the UN pushed the Chinese back north of the 38th parallel the following year, Unit 4 followed yet again to operate from its final wartime base at Seoul's busy Seoul City Airport. As the war progressed Seoul City Airport would be nicknamed "Spook City" in response to the growing number of black-painted aircraft at the field supporting military and CIA covert operations.

Unit 4 was re-designated in February 1951 as the "Special Air Missions (SAM)" Detachment (still of the 21st TCS), a name change that had no appreciable effect on its unconventional air warfare mission. Even in its heyday however, SAM support to OSO and OPC suffered from two related problems. The first was the Air Force policy of rotating aircrews from the combat zone within short months of their arrival; or just as their skills were beginning to develop. The SAM Detachment was able to reduce the impact of this policy to some degree with a small pool of volunteers who extended their SAM tours for various personal reasons. The second problem was quite simple: The SAM Detachment seldom counted more than three C-47s operational at the same time, not

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counting two more C-47s equipped with loudspeakers for battlefield propaganda missions.⁷

In response to Agency requests for more air support, the Fifth Air Force activated B Flight, 6167th Operations Squadron, at Seoul City Airport in April, 1952. Unlike the C-47-only SAM Detachment that it eventually replaced, B Flight was assigned C-46 and C-47 transports as well as B-26 light bombers. The fast B-26s proved a popular agent insertion aircraft, once modified to carry up to six parachutists in their bombays. And like the SAM infiltration's, B Flight successfully ranged throughout North Korea, and occasionally into China itself. Unfortunately, B Flight had other similarities with the SAM Detachment that could only hurt the Agency's air operations.

Both units were only partially committed to the demanding night, low-level infiltration flights that demanded highly experienced aircrews who volunteered for such missions. When not performing these missions the aircrews were used for VIP transport, loudspeaker and leaflet drop missions, and flare-ship flights to light up the night skies near the front lines. Neither unit was screened for volunteers-only, and with the odd exception, most airmen were ready to leave when their tours were up. And as the Agency discovered to its dismay, even this difficulty was further exacerbated with yet another twist of Air force policy.

The length of the individual airman's B Flight tours was predicated on the number and type of missions flown. Perhaps to encourage non-volunteers to complete the more dangerous infiltration missions, the Air Force sweetened the pot with a new way of calculating missions completed. According to CIA archives

(S) The USAF crews of B Flight were able to receive credit for two missions and actually penetrate the bomb line once. For example, if they dropped [parachutists or supplies] above a certain area or flew over five hours, the crew was credited with two missions. It was not unusual for B Flight crews to rotate every three or four months . . . completing their 75 missions and returning to the United States about the time they were acquiring skill.^{xvii}

From studying post-mission reports the CIA concluded that B Flight's lack of skill in the night infiltration's appeared to be due to a lack of training in this demanding field. And in fact the Agency's conclusions were absolutely correct. The non-volunteers assigned to the Flight had no experience in unconventional warfare and worse yet, were given only 3-4 days "indoctrination" before being assigned to Agency (and military) missions. In it's Unit History report for the second half of 1952, the 6167th laments

⁷ While dedicated to unconventional warfare, the SAM Detachment was handed another mission as well: VIP support! For this high-profile mission the SAM was assigned a WWII-era B-17 bomber, converted to carry passengers. During the winter of 1951-52, the B-17 was diverted to drop six JACK teams behind enemy lines (*THE SECRET WAR IN KOREA*, 22 (S)). Oddly, the potentially dangerous combination of high-profile VIP transport and highly-classified unconventional warfare missions flown by the same small unit doesn't seem to have raised any eyebrows within the Agency or the military.

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problems caused by the lack of qualified aircrews . . . *in particular navigators . . . due to constant rotations* [emphasis added].

Agency frustrations and apprehension with the problem were undoubtedly due in part to the fact that essentially it was an Air Force problem that affected the "customer" far more than the Air Force. On many missions the Agency discovered that inserting its agents was simply one of the many missions to be performed by the aircraft that night. Inserting other agents from other units (with the attendant security problems that incurs), leaflet drops or flare missions were sometimes all combined in one flight. Missed drop zones frequently caused serious, mission-threatening injuries to the parachutists, or left supplies dangling high in trees, like neon lights advertising the location of the partisans to enemy troops in the area. And by 1952 the tragic consequences of such aircrew blunders had already been demonstrated, at a cost of lives, in the disaster that befell Operation *Spitfire*.

In July of 1951 a military special operations team composed of British, American and Korean soldiers parachuted behind enemy lines with the mission of setting up a rear-area base camp from which to conduct guerrilla warfare operations. The team was inserted with only minor problems, but the following resupply drops were plagued with the problems alluded to early when drop zones are missed, sometimes by miles. And in the early morning hours of 6 July one such resupply effort to the *Spitfire* team blew the entire mission with an act of folly almost beyond comprehension.

Despite the fact the team at the drop zone was in radio contact with the resupply aircraft, and was marking the area with flashlights, the aircrew were unable to locate the team. Rather than return another night to complete the mission, the pilot returned to base, refueled, and returned to the area an hour before dawn. Still unable to locate the drop zone, and ignoring the team's radio plea to leave the area, the pilot circled the area into the daylight hours before finally dropping the supplies . . . not on the drop zone which was never located, but by sheer accident on the team's secret hideout a mile away!

The use of loudspeakers and road maps could not have done more to mark the team's position to enemy troops observing the whole show.²⁴⁻¹¹ On the run immediately, the team moved straight into an ambush. Only the valor of two team members, one American and one Korean, who sacrificed themselves to allow the remaining team members to escape, permitted the eventual return of the *Spitfire* survivors to friendly lines some two weeks later. The manner in which the aircrew terminated *Spitfire* sent reverberations throughout the unconventional warfare community.

By 1953 JACK estimated that it had airdropped at least [redacted] agents. Acknowledging however the incompleteness of its wartime records, the files indicate the number was almost certainly much higher. Referring back to the air support problem(s), the archives conclude

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The whole aim of air activity in Korea seemed to be quantity, not quality.

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Tons and tons of rice and other commodities, as well as [REDACTED] personnel, were dropped into North Korea during the war period from 25 June 1950 to 27 July 1953.²¹²

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JACK's airborne infiltration's had their own techniques which varied from military, *Spitfire*-type operations in several aspects. The agents jumped in civilian clothes, using the military standard T-10 parachute but without adding the reserve parachute as required in military jumps. This was not the callousness it might appear. As most jumps were conducted at 500 feet (well below the peacetime 1100 feet standard), the addition of a reserve 'chute was more a psychological comfort to the jumper than a realistic option in the event of a main 'chute malfunction.

JACK-USAF operations had been going on for a considerable time before either service became aware of a major disconnect in communications that was costing them dearly. Time after time B Flight aircrews would report a successful resupply drop, while the agents at the drop zone were radioing back at virtually the same time to base station asking what happened to their resupply. The core problem was not discovered until the fall of 1952, when an investigation revealed that for many missions the aircrews had not been briefed on the CIA drop zone marking signals taught to the agents. That this all-important gap had existed for so long was due largely to the strict security compartmentation intentionally designed to keep the operations secret; a tragic case of the left hand not knowing what the right hand was doing.

Immediately prior to the take-off the team was moved from a building on the airfield to a briefing hut near the aircraft's arrival point. The case officer would check team equipment, go over the mission yet one more time, and in general keep the team focused and motivated. At a signal the team was taken in the back of a canvas-covered truck to the airplane. Once at the aircraft, neither the team nor the case officer talked to the aircrew.

For obvious reasons drop zones were selected in remote areas, with the additional criteria they be within three walking days of the target area. Whenever possible, at least one of the infiltrated team member's would have friends or relatives within the target area. Teams frequently took a pair of Air Force-trained carrier pigeons for intercept-free communications, the birds carrying coded messages indicating the team's status after infiltration.

Even though agents were give false documents and cover stories should they be captured, the false identities reflected more on their Agency-trained handler's faith in intelligence tradecraft, than the Korean's confidence in their usefulness. What the Korean agent's did find useful was the issuance of barter items such as gold rings, medical supplies, and other hard to get items in North Korea's wartorn economy.

Having clearly given the issue of air support considerable thought, JACK concludes in its report for the final year of the war that had the Agency been given

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complete control of its air support during the war, it would have needed no more than three aircraft, with CIA-trained crews, to improve on the performance rendered by B Flight. A harsh judgment, especially considering that other JACK histories of the period show a much-improved B Flight performance as the war progressed.⁸ In retrospect, the pessimistic conclusion may yet be closer to the truth, if only because both the SAM Detachment and B Flight archives of this period are replete with many of the same complaints voiced by JACK officers.

While the Agency would benefit from the higher experience levels found within its own aircrews flying Civil Air Transport (CAT) planes, it would also receive a painful reminder that one danger in particular posed a threat that could not be overcome even by the most experienced and brave of its pilots. That reminder came in November, 1952, on a long range mission that took a CAT C-47 and its crew deep into northern China. As dangerous as the area was, the mission itself would go a step further in its daring. The task was nothing less than extracting an agent, at night, using the air-to-ground recovery system that had only recently been deemed reliable enough to use.

On its first pass over the designated pick-up zone, the CAT crew dropped the recovery system equipment needed by the ground party to prepare the agent for extraction. On the second pass . . . disaster struck. Rather than finding an agent ready for pick-up, the C-47 flew into a hail of gunfire just as it was at the slowest and lowest phase of the pick-up.¹ The pilot and co-pilot died in the crash (their bodies were never returned), and two Agency employees in the back of the aircraft, Americans John T. Downey and Richard Fecteau were marched off to Chinese prisons for decades.⁹

Back in Japan Agency personnel suspected but could not confirm what had happened, as no distress call had been received from the doomed crew. At the Agency's request the Far East Air Forces conducted a publicized sea search between Korea and Japan for an overdue aircraft. The search would provide the needed cover story in the event the Chinese chose to exploit the shootdown for propaganda purposes.¹¹ Curiously, the Chinese had little to say about the incident at the time. In fact it was not until November, 1954, sixteen months after the war was over, before the Chinese even confirmed their capture of the two. It was a bitter loss to the Agency and the CAT crews who knew the men personally.

Maritime Operations

With over 5,000 miles of coastline the Korean peninsula was a natural for coastal raiding forces or clandestine agent insertions, both of which were done by CCRAK and Agency guerrilla forces. And late in the summer of 1950 a CIA/Korean raiding party

⁸ See *THE SECRET WAR IN KOREA*, June 1950 - June 1952, 19. (S)

⁹ Downey received a life sentence, and Fecteau 20 years. Both are now leading quiet, low-profile lives in the United States.

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operating from a US destroyer pulled off one of the most remarkable and successful missions of the war.

Included in the communists' propaganda mill even early in the war was the charge that the United States was engaged in germ warfare. However fallacious the charge to American ears, it was not a claim that could not go unanswered, especially because in one area highlighted by the communists there did indeed appear to be an epidemic of some kind. FECOM's answer was to send its Command Surgeon General, Brigadier Crawford F. Sams, into the area to inspect the situation first-hand. The joker in the communists' deck was that they controlled the area identified in their propaganda!

The plan that evolved and in fact later executed required the CIA/Korean team bring the general ashore at night in blacked out conditions. From there the team established security around the fishing village, established contact with the village chiefs, and brought General (doctor) Sams into to diagnose those stricken with the disease over the next few hours. Having concluded his examinations the General was taken back to the destroyer with conclusive proof the disease was due to natural causes. Going public with the general's findings the US subsequently watched the communists' propaganda dry up virtually overnight. For his part, General Sams received the Distinguished Service Cross for his part in the mission, while the Agency as usual, received its "well done" in silence.¹¹

One of the more successful hit-and-run raids conducted by a CIA/Korean demolition¹² team occurred on the night of 25 January 1952, when a [REDACTED] force came ashore on Korea's northeastern coastline, about nine miles south of Songjin. Departing from the US Navy's APD Wantuck, a destroyer-escort type ship converted to carry troops for just such a mission, the commandos struck a train sitting between two tunnels. In addition to derailing the locomotive and a tender, one small railroad trestle was destroyed, eleven North Korean soldiers were killed and one captured. The attacking force suffered no casualties.¹²

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Escape and Evasion

During the Korean War an airman downed behind enemy lines had two possible sources of rescue. The simplest and most likely to succeed would come in the shape of a special operations or Air Rescue Service helicopter arriving within an hour or so of the shootdown. This overt type of rescue often came down to a race between the American helicopter and the North Koreans nearest the downed pilot¹³. The second, covert source of rescue was much more complex and more pertinent to the "rescuee", much more difficult to pull off.

As with so many other issues involving US efforts to operate behind communist lines in Korea, the Escape & Evasion (E&E) program became the object of a bureaucratic

¹³ For an excellent example of this type of rescue, read "The USAF's Secret Psywar Weapon" in this book.

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tug-of-war between the Agency and the FECOM. And in the end the resolution also took the form found with the other issues, a compromise in which both CIA and military forces formed an uneasy alliance within CCRAK. Within this organization the Director accepted the responsibility for all covert E&E operations . . . then promptly turned the job over to his Deputy Director, who as previously described was also the head of JACK, the CIA team in Korea. The E&E program also generated a rare CIA-USAF battle, one born of Air Force frustration with the Agency that began early in the war.

In response to a September 7, 1950 request for E&E support from the Commander, Fifth Air Force, the Agency began training [redacted] Korean nationals [redacted] ¹⁴ A scant six weeks later, [redacted] four-man teams were ready for infiltration into North Korea to assist future downed aircrews. The early war haste proved not worth the effort however, as on 27 October Far East Air Forces (FEAF) canceled the program "in view of the fact that neither time nor space was at the time available to place the program into operation."¹⁵ Worth noting is that the FEAF cancellation was made in the euphoria following the successful Inchon landing after which the North Korean army was in full retreat toward its northern border with China. 1.5 (1)
1.6 (d)(1)

Following the unexpected entry of the Chinese into the war in late 1950, another E&E program was hastily put together. Agency records show that

By 1 February 1951, under the second program, of [redacted] men available, [redacted] were operating as teams in the field, [redacted] were awaiting launch from Pusan, and [redacted] were in training [redacted] The men who had been launched were dropped into the teeth of the unexpected Chinese invasion . . . without reception committees and sufficient operational data . . . all the teams except one . . . were either lost or exfiltrated.¹⁶

The operational losses of the second group dictated a change in tactics, away from the four-man team concept to one termed "general resistance warfare groups". This longish term simply meant guerrilla groups that could presumably stay in place behind communist lines by virtue of receiving support from the locals. This change of tactics had merit, and failed to produce for a reason that even the Agency's World War II OSS veterans were slow to understand.

The bald fact was that the "totalitarian" Nazis against which most OSS veterans had gained their unconventional warfare experience, couldn't compare with the brutal repression practiced by North Korean communists on their own people. Any area or village even suspected of harboring or aiding guerrillas suffered the most ruthless reprisals. This fact alone quickly dried up any hope the pro-US guerrillas (most of them North Koreans themselves) could provide an effective E&E network, or anything else, in communist controlled territory.

The ineffectiveness of the Agency's covert E&E program led to a predictably small return of airmen downed in enemy territory. The few that did escape with the assistance

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of guerrillas did so more by chance encounters than a planned effort. And no contact had yet been made with any of the allied prisoners caged in communists POW camps (a fact that would remain true for the duration of the war).

FEAF leaders took the heat from their aircrews for several months, then in May, 1952, took their long-simmering frustration to FECOM with a proposal to take the covert E&E mission away from the Agency. Several high-level meetings ensued, the fall-out from which was that the CIA would keep the mission, but only after beefing up the resources it promised to commit to the mission. For its part, the military also committed to adding resources to the E&E program.

Another fall-out of the meetings was the acknowledgment on all sides that an effective E&E network in North Korea itself was simply not feasible. And from that acknowledgment came the decision to exploit the potential of islands off the North Korean coast as rescue bases from which to retrieve downed airmen. The obvious need was for small watercraft to operate between island and to/from the mainland itself.

This need led to the Agency procuring [redacted] small craft, with Korean crews and radio operators, as well as a 50-ton "mother ship" dedicated to covert E&E.¹¹ The Air Force and Navy provided technical assistance and protection should the small craft come under attack from the North Koreans. Headquarters CIA approved the plan on 27 May 1952, [redacted] 1.5 (1)
1.6 (dX)

During the same month an offer to assist the E&E program came from an unexpected quarter, when CIA Headquarters informed JACK that Britain's Royal Air Force was contemplating sending a specialized E&E force of [redacted] officers and men to Korea.¹² The British, who had nearly a thousand POWs of their own in Korea at the time, were considering parachuting a number of its force behind enemy lines, a concept similar to the four-man teams envisioned by the Agency itself early in the war. Based on its own experiences and the growing awareness of the futility of such schemes in North Korea, the Agency advised against the British initiative.

The provision of additional Agency and military resources to the covert E&E program, acquisition of a small fleet of coastal boats, operations from off-shore islands north of the 38th parallel, and improved coordination with CCRAK, all combined to improve operations at the field level. But the one nut that could not be and never was cracked was the communists' iron grip on the North Korean population. Worse yet, once truce talks began in July, 1951, the North Koreans and Chinese released thousands of front-line troops for "internal security operations," effectively ending even the modest guerrilla operations on the mainland.¹³ And throughout all these tribulations, the bureaucratic never quite went away.

¹¹ The US and South Koreans did the same things to deal with the thousands of communist guerrillas operating south of the 38th parallel.

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In November, 1952, Headquarters CIA found fault with JACK's E&E tactics in northwest Korea, as it would do later elsewhere.¹² Pointing out that the Agency's role and responsibility were limited to covert E&E, the Headquarters noted JACK's increasing involvement and semi-over and overt rescue missions. Given JACK's position and responsibility for E&E within CCRAK, such missions could hardly be avoided when the opportunity presented itself. But the Headquarters criticism did underscore the importance the new Agency placed on defining its role (and authority) when dealing with the much longer established and powerful bureaucracies in the Pentagon.

In December, 1953, five months after the armistice was signed, the Agency's North Asia Command provided a candid insight into its view of E&E operations during the war with the following comment:

The E&E program in Korea was of such magnitude and scope that it could only have been accomplished by a truly joint effort by all the services and CIA. At no time during the period of the Korean war was there a truly concerted effort by all the services and CIA in E&E activity.¹³

JACK formally terminated its E&E program in Korea as of September 30, 1954.¹⁴

Resistance Operations

In September, 1950, an OPC team [REDACTED]

[REDACTED], initiated 1.5(c) 1.6(d)(1) one of the Agency's earliest attempts to set up an underground resistance network¹⁵ under an umbrella enabling program.¹⁶ The principal Korean operative was a South Korean army captain who requested support to maintain an extensive underground contacts he claimed to control in North Korea.

During the course of the following year, OPC infiltrated by air and sea [REDACTED] agents in [REDACTED] teams into central and northeast North Korea.¹⁷ While contact with at least [REDACTED] teams was lost almost immediately, the other teams managed to survive and even consolidate forces in certain areas. By November, 1951, the Agency was still in steady radio contact with [REDACTED] remaining teams who by now totaled nearly [REDACTED] men, including local recruits. The teams themselves ranged in size from [REDACTED] to [REDACTED] men.¹⁸

The onset of Korea's notorious winter weather brought with it radio instructions from OPC to break down into smaller units and concentrate on survival until the following spring. Even this wasn't enough for the beleaguered [REDACTED] teams for by January, 1952, only [REDACTED] teams were still in communication; by March [REDACTED] of these were believed to have been captured and doubled. In April OPC attempted to resurrect the

¹⁵ Within a short period [REDACTED] evolved from a resistance network concept to that of a more heavily armed and aggressive guerrilla force.

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movement, using the [redacted] as the nucleus of a new guerrilla force. To train the replacement's OPC used its Yang-do facility near Pusan where it put approximately [redacted] Koreans through its guerrilla training regime. It was also at this time that Project names were changed from [redacted]

In addition to its replacement personnel, [redacted] teams were reorganized to accomplish three separate missions:

(1) Special Action Teams (SAT), consisting of [redacted] men, to be infiltrated by sea and air to conduct hit and run raids for [North Korean] documentation and area intelligence, and to cache supplies for E&E/PM requirements of the Mission. These teams were to operate without radio transmitters and were to be exfiltrated by sea after completion of their mission.

(2) Special Mission Groups (SMG), to continue amphibious commando raids for purposes of intelligence collection, kidnapping, and sabotage along the east coast of North Korea with which segments of the project had been involved since 1951.

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1.6 (d) (1)

(3) Resistance cadre, to operate in small cells in establishing resistance activities in North Korea.¹²

The ambitious [redacted] program ran into problems almost immediately, as by early summer of 1952 suspicions were running deep that many of the teams infiltrated after training had already been doubled by the communists. OPC itself judged that by this period [redacted] operations were at their least effective since the program was begun the following year.¹² Worse yet, it became clear to OPC officers the communists themselves were sufficiently aware of [redacted] to target the organization for its double agents.¹² Captured guerrillas were told to return to the Yang-do facility, learn everything possible about the organization, then volunteer to return to North Korea, where of course they could defect at the first opportunity to make their report.

There were many variations to the double-agent game, with perhaps the most common one being that of a doubled guerrilla team sending low-level but accurate reports back to base, while continuing to receive resupply airdrops and perhaps infiltrating agents who would be killed or doubled themselves after being captured at the drop zone. There are a number of solutions to the problem once the "doubling" is detected, and the Agency used one of the most effective with the double [redacted] team in August, 1952.

Some months prior to that August, radio operators at JACK were surprised to hear from one team [redacted] that it had lost its radio but not its communications plan¹³. By sheer chance it had encountered another team [redacted] that had its radio but not a communications plan. Though suspicious, JACK authorized the two small teams to join

¹³ The communications plan carried the radio frequencies, codes, reporting times, etc., with which the teams would communicate with home base.

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forces as the team was one of the only teams working in a critical area at that time.^{b6} JACK's suspicions were also fueled by the team's failure to give correct responses to several test questions transmitted to them, as well as the team's request for luxury items and women's apparel, both known to be high on the priority list of communist officials in North Korea. Finally, the team's fate was sealed in April, 1952, when a defecting communist from that area confirmed to JACK officers that the team had indeed been doubled^{b6}.

Following JACK's decision to "terminate the contract" a special air resupply was scheduled with the team, and in fact parachuted to it on 3 August 1952. One bundle contained the requested luxury items and women's clothing, which when removed from the container, set off an explosion from the explosives buried underneath. In another container was a note addressed to the communist province chief, known by name to the Agency. The note stated the chief's "southern neighbors" had known the team was doubled for some time, and had profited well from what it had learned." Agency archives note cryptically [REDACTED] was never heard from again . . .^{b6}

In August and September of 1952 Project [REDACTED] took 100% losses as [REDACTED] airdropped teams virtually disappeared after parachuting into North Korea.^{b6} Agency archives report [REDACTED] teams successfully resupplied by air, but then notes the teams were issued radio receivers only, no transmitters. From such reports it seems likely [REDACTED] airdrops were successfully completed at drop zones pre-arranged before the teams were infiltrated. Whether the teams were actually at the drop zone, or whether they were but had already been doubled by the communists, can be little more than speculation. As noted elsewhere, North Korean and Chinese control of their territory by late 1952 was so final that [REDACTED] type operations could be better described as suicide missions for the team members.

1.5 (C)
1.6 (d)

Apparently the Koreans had already noticed that none of their predecessors ever seemed to return, as formerly good relations between them and their Agency trainers began to deteriorate sharply. So bad [REDACTED] that none of the SATs were ever infiltrated. The seaborne SMGs carried out a few minor raids along the coast, yielding little of value, but they too were afflicted with poor morale for a number of valid reasons. Not only were their team mates not returning from missions, but by this time it was painfully clear to the guerrillas that the UN was not going back north to reunite the two Koreas.

Now seemingly homeless for good, the North Korean volunteers also faced the South Korean government's open suspicion of these "outsiders". By the fall of 1952 the US military and the Agency had trained and armed thousands of North Koreans for a return to their homeland that was now beyond their hopes. The tension, and potential danger to the Americans in the [REDACTED] guerrilla camps) was getting worse by the month. A final Agency assessment [REDACTED] was conducted in late 1952, the conclusion of which was that the organization "had been too thoroughly penetrated by

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the communists and would have to be abandoned, including all the personnel of the SMGs.¹⁰⁰ⁱⁱⁱ

Aftermath

The Korean War caught the CIA in its infancy, just as it caught the military in its lowest cycle since the stampede to demobilize at the end of World War II. Both organizations suffered badly in their attempts to organize covert warfare behind communist lines on the Korean peninsula, although for markedly different reasons. Notable successes were few and those that occurred almost all took place before the truce talks began in the summer of 1951, two years before the final armistice was signed. But if the Korean War gave the Agency its share of hard knocks, it also proved to be the generator of an expansion unimagined even by its strongest proponents. And as in every expansion, not everyone at the station got aboard the train.

Even before the war was over Hans Toft's fortunes with the Agency had begun to wane. A widely-distributed movie he had produced allegedly depicting an actual paramilitary combat operation in Korea turned out to be stage managed, much to the Agency's subsequent embarrassment.^{100iv} Later, when an Agency operation in which Toft was involved went sour in Latin America, Toft was further tainted. And when the Agency accidentally discovered in 1955 that Toft was keeping classified documents in his apartment, his employment with the CIA was terminated.^{100v}

¹ Sanche de Gramont, *THE SECRET WAR. The Story of International Espionage Since World War II*, (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1962), 129.

² L. Fletcher Prouty, *JFK, The CIA, Vietnam and The Plot to Assassinate John F. Kennedy*, (New York: Carol Publishing Group, 1992), 18.

³ *Ibid.*, 26.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 27.

⁵ Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., *US ARMY SPECIAL WARFARE, Its Origins*, (National Defense University Press: Washington DC, 1982), 41.

⁶ Maj Gen John K. Singlaub, *HAZARDOUS DUTY, An American Soldier in the Twentieth Century*, (Summit Books: New York, 1991), 165-168.

⁷ Clay Blair, *The FORGOTTEN WAR, America in Korea, 1950-1953*, (Times Books: New York, 1987), 53.

⁸ Max Hastings, *THE KOREAN WAR*, (London, Michael Joseph, Ltd., 1987), 292.

⁹ Joseph C. Goulden, *KOREA, The Untold Story Of The War*, (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1982), 466.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ Paddock, 45.

¹² Corson, *Armies of Ignorance*, 304. Quoted in Paddock, 75.

¹³ Goulden, 466.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 463.

¹⁵ *CIA IN KOREA, 1946-1965*, Vol III, July, 1973, 104. (S)

¹⁶ Blair, 58.

¹⁷ Singlaub, 144, 165. See also Goulden, 467-471.

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- ^{xviii} Goulden, 471.
- ^{xix} Maj Steve A. Fondacaro, "A Strategic Analysis of U.S. Special Operations during the Korean Conflict, 1950 - 1953", a thesis presented to the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Ft Leavenworth, KS, 1983, 49.
- ^{xx} *CIA IN KOREA*, Vol III, 95. (S)
- ^{xxi} *Ibid.*, 100.
- ^{xxii} Goulden, 459.
- ^{xxiii} *CIA IN KOREA*, Vol III, 97. (S)
- ^{xxiv} *INFILTRATION AND RESUPPLY OF AGENTS IN NORTH KOREA, 1952 - 1953, Vol I, December, 1972*, 129. (S)
- ^{xxv} *CIA IN KOREA*, Vol III, 98. (S)
- ^{xxvi} *INFILTRATION*, 34. (S)
- ^{xxvii} Singlaub, 181. See also *CIA IN KOREA*, Vol III, 96. (S)
- ^{xxviii} *CIA IN KOREA*, Vol III, 97. (S)
- ^{xxix} *Ibid.*
- ^{xxx} *THE SECRET WAR, June 1950 - 1952, July, 1963*, 20. (S)
- ^{xxxi} *Ibid.*, 3. (S)
- ^{xxxii} *Ibid.*, 4. (S)
- ^{xxxiii} *THE SECRET WAR IN KOREA*, 3. (S)
- ^{xxxiv} *Ibid.* (S)
- ^{xxxv} *Ibid.*, 5. (S)
- ^{xxxvi} *Ibid.* (S)
- ^{xxxvii} *Ibid.*, 9. (S)
- ^{xxxviii} *Ibid.*, 10. (S)
- ^{xxxix} *Ibid.*, 11. (S)
- ^{xl} *Ibid.*, 75 (S)
- ^{xli} *THE SECRET WAR*, 73. (S)
- ^{xlii} *Ibid.*
- ^{xliiii} *Ibid.*
- ^{xliiv} *CIA IN KOREA*, Vol III, 96. (S)
- ^{xlii} *Ibid.*
- ^{xlii} *THE SECRET WAR*, 19. (S)
- ^{xlii} *INFILTRATION AND RESUPPLY OF AGENTS IN NORTH KOREA, 1952-1953, December, 1972*, 399. (S)
- ^{xliii} *Evanhoe*, 111-114.
- ^{xliii} *INFILTRATION*, 144-145. (S)
- ^{li} *THE NORTH ASIA COMMAND, 1952 - 1956*, 23. (S)
- ^{li} *Ibid.*, 24. (S)
- ^{li} *THE SECRET WAR*, 23. (S)
- ^{li} *Ibid.*, Appendix F. (S)
- ^{li} *INFILTRATION*, 160. (S)
- ^{li} *Ibid.*
- ^{li} *Ibid.*, 161. (S)
- ^{li} *Ibid.*, 165. (S)
- ^{li} *Ibid.* (S)
- ^{li} *Ibid.* (S)
- ^{li} *Ibid.*, 171. (S)
- ^{li} *Ibid.*, 382. (S)
- ^{li} *Ibid.*, 382.
- ^{li} *Ibid.*, 129. (S)
- ^{li} *Ibid.* (S)
- ^{li} *Ibid.* (S)

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¹⁰⁰¹ Ibid., 131-132. (S)

¹⁰⁰² Ibid., 132 (S)

¹⁰⁰³ Ibid. (S)

¹⁰⁰⁴ Ibid., 96. (S)

¹⁰⁰⁵ Ibid., 97. (S)

¹⁰⁰⁶ Ibid., 98. (S)

¹⁰⁰⁷ Ibid., 133. (S)

¹⁰⁰⁸ Ibid., 134. (S)

¹⁰⁰⁹ Thomas Powers, *THE MAN WHO KEPT THE SECRETS, Richard Helms and the CIA*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979), 323-324.

¹⁰¹⁰ Ibid.

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